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Kant’s Transcendental Turn as a Second Phase in the
Logicization of Philosophy
Nikolay Milkov
This paper advances an assessment of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonmade
from a bird’s eye view. Seen from this perspective, the task of Kant’s work
was to ground the spontaneity of human reason, preserving at the same
time the strict methods of science and mathematics. Kant accomplished
this objective by reviving an old philosophical discipline: the peirastic di-
alectic of Plato and Aristotle. What is more, he managed to combine it
with logic. From this blend, Kant’s transcendental idealism appeared as
a new logic that paralleled Aristotle’s syllogistic logic. The first result of
this move was that philosophy became a formal study that treats even
such subjects as ethics with rigour. Another outcome was that it establish-
ed philosophy as a professional – school – discipline. In the twentieth
century academy, this development was echoed by the emergence of an-
alytic philosophy, in which Kant’s new logic evolved into a philosophical
logic.
1 Opening
Some twenty years ago the “new phenomenologist” Hermann Schmitz
raised the question, “What did Kant really want?” (Was wollte Kant?)
His answer was that the prime objective of Kant’s critical philosophy
was to theoretically ground the spontaneity of reason.1
This paper builds upon Hermann Schmitz’s thesis. Indeed, in his Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (KrV) Kant did want to secure the spontaneity of
reason. Unfortunately, Schmitz failed to specify the theoretical resources
which Kant used in order to carry out this task. The first objective in
what follows here is to fill this gap. In particular, the aim is to reveal a
neglected side of Kant’s project of making philosophy a free activity of
reason. What will be demonstrated is that in Kant’s theoretical philoso-
phy, the spontaneity of reason appears in the form of a recurrent examin-
1 Cf. Schmitz, Hermann: Was wollte Kant? Bonn 1989, 365.
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ing of human knowledge. Further, we shall see that one can view this con-
ception as a recasting of the Platonic project for peirastic dialectic. Final-
ly, and most importantly, the present paper shows that Kant’s novel var-
iant of peirastic dialectic was married to logic. An important consequence
of this unity was that it helped him to logicize all philosophy, including
ethics and aesthetics.
Moreover, Kant’s move will appear as the second phase of a tripartite
diachronic process of logicization of philosophy. The first historical phase
originated in Antiquity when Aristotle logicized Plato’s peirastic dialectic
– a development discussed briefly in § 2. The main body of the paper,
§§ 3 and 4, will be occupied with analysis of the second, Kantian
phase of the logicization of philosophy. In particular, we shall see that
Kant’s logical revolution in philosophy was in many ways related to
that of Aristotle. Finally, § 5 turns to the story of how analytic philosophy
stands as a third phase of doing philosophy in logical terms. This culmi-
nating point of the paper opens a new dimension for investigating the
roots of the early analytic philosophy.
2 First phase of the logicization of philosophy
A great bifurcation in philosophy took place in Antiquity in the works of
Plato and Aristotle. Roughly, it was a bifurcation between critical philos-
ophy and logical philosophy. How did this come about?
At the beginning, Plato (Plato’s Socrates) conceived of philosophy as
peirastic dialectic. The latter can be defined as examination of a situation
about which we are ignorant; this can be any suggested argument or theo-
ry, but also facts or events under consideration.2 The objective was to se-
lect the best argument or theory among many others. It also deserves no-
tice that Plato’s method of examination was connected with his method
of division, or analysis.3
Soon, however, he started to look for a rigorous, “formal science”
(Prol, AA 04: 262) that could do this job with greater confidence.
Plato found it in the Forms, which are supposed to be the subject of
2 Cf. Urmson, J. O.: The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary. London 1990, 127; Ar-
istotle, Soph.El. , 165a38, 171b4.
3 On Plato as the discoverer of analysis, both in mathematics and in philosophy,
see Sayre, Kenneth: Plato’s Analytic Method. Chicago 1969.
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this autonomous type of inquiry. In fact, this was the first effort to sys-
tematize peirastic dialectic.
Plato’s task was taken up by Aristotle. Above all, he fused the disci-
pline of truth-seeking (peirastic) with the Theory of Forms into a Theory
of General Kinds. This blending found expression in his Categories. The
next step was the discovery of syllogism.4 It was made by blending the
Theory of Forms – central to both Plato and to Aristotle’s Categories –
with the method of division (analysis) into a new discipline. The novelty
was that whereas the method of division accepted that the middle term of
a judgment is universal, the syllogistic method claimed that the middle
term must be subordinated to the first and third terms. Of course, Aris-
totle’s syllogistic logic did not have the heuristic power of the peirastic
method. In compensation, though, it was far more rigorous.
This move had two important results: (i) Ontology became more for-
mal; more specifically, the Theory of Forms was replaced by an investi-
gation of being qua being, or the “logical forms.” The resulting autono-
mous discipline was subsequently called metaphysics. (ii) The new science
of logical forms radically diminished the prominence of mathematical
knowledge in the eyes of both philosophers and mathematicians. The rea-
son for this change was that metaphysics was now conceived as an alter-
native formal discipline in a way more fundamental than mathematics.
This belief was abandoned only in the late sixteenth and the early seven-
teenth centuries when Vietae and Descartes rediscovered the practice of
(mathematical) analysis and made it autonomous again.
3 Kant’s rediscovery of peirastic dialectic
3.1 Introduction
Kant was the greatest synoptic thinker in the history of philosophy. This
is clear in his masterpiece, KrV, in which he deduced all a priori concepts
from a single principle and within one system. His synoptic thinking was
not only logical, however, it was historical as well. Indeed, it has been
claimed from the beginning that KrV was an attempt to combine the em-
piricist and rationalist traditions in philosophy. What follows is principal-
ly concerned with another side of Kant’s historically synoptic thought: his
4 On the discovery of syllogism cf. Ross, W. D.: “The Discovery of Syllogism”. The
Philosophical Review 48 (1939), 251–71.
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integration of the two philosophical disciplines just mentioned, viz. , peir-
astic dialectic (which, as we shall presently see, he referred to as “criti-
cism”) and syllogistic logic, which two had been kept separate for more
than 2000 years.
Apparently, this step of Kant’s was prompted by the publication in
1765 of Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais.5 Leibniz argued that the “new philos-
ophers [above all Descartes and Locke] have carried the reform [of phi-
losophy] too far.” Instead, he pleaded, “to rehabilitate the old philosophy
and restore the all but banished substantial [logical] forms.” Kant was
deeply impressed by Leibniz’s appeal.
Recall that in the early 1760s Kant was widely known to be a brilliant
analyst. When in 1763 the Prussian Academy of Science in Berlin organ-
ised a philosophic competition asking “Are the metaphysical truths at all
open for the clear proofs of geometry?”, he won the second price (the first
price went to Moses Mendelssohn). After Kant read Leibniz’s Nouveaux
Essais, however, he experienced a change of heart – he turned back to
the Greeks. He did not, however, stay with the Aristotelian substantial
forms, as Leibniz advised. Instead, Kant revived a long forgotten philo-
sophical subfield – the peirastic dialectic. As we have noted, Plato discov-
ered the latter, which Aristotle developed further, even as he rendered it
fairly toothless in the process (in the sense that it lost its heuristic power).
In the Middle Ages it was extensively discussed but often misunderstood
and misinterpreted. After the analytical revolution of Vietae and Des-
cartes, which restored the importance of mathematics, it was entirely for-
gotten. But not in Germany, however. It was preserved there in the sev-
enteenth century, in Kçnigsberg, where Kant came upon it in the eight-
eenth century.6
To be more specific, in KrV Kant managed to transform the old dis-
cipline of peirastic dialectic above all into the idea that human knowledge
recurrently tests its origins. By such testing, the subject is free to decide
what is to be preserved as knowledge and what is to be rejected as illu-
sion.7 In fact, that is how Kant incorporated the spontaneity of reason
5 Cf. Tonelli, Giorgio: “Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-Aristotelischen Termino-
logie bei Kant whrend der Entstehung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. Archiv
fr Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964), 234.
6 Cf. Tonelli, op. cit. , 241.
7 This point is emphasized in Robert Brandom’s paper “Kant on Judgement and
Representation”, published in these Proceedings. He argues that judgment is an
activity of synthesizing new endorsements with the old endorsements. Further-
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into philosophy (Hermann Schmitz’s problem from § 1), making it an
indispensable part of the latter. In doing so, he substantiated it theoret-
ically.
In Kant’s applied philosophy (which is not the subject of this study)
the critical practice of peirastic dialectic found expression in the exercise
of ethical freedom. Finally, it was articulated in Kant’s famous dictum
that we cannot learn philosophy but only learn to do philosophy
(A 837/B 865). To be more precise, we do philosophy differently every
time, depending on the state of affairs or the argument with which we
are confronted and which we are to assess (judge).
3.2 Epistemological peirastic dialectic
The origin-testing, or “critique”, of human knowledge is realized in KrV
on three levels: perception, understanding, and reason:
(a) Perception. In our perception we synthesize noumena with forms.
More especially, every judgement of perception tests the matter which af-
fects our senses so that the subject chooses certain elements out of the
multiplicity of the matter – disregarding other elements – and orders
them in a certain form.
(b) Understanding. Kant was adamant that our understanding (grasp-
ing) is not merely a calculation. The mere picking out of data from ex-
perience and putting them in accurate forms is not enough in order to
receive new knowledge. Rather, by every act of grasping individuals
and facts we also penetrate “to [the] empirical or experimental conditions
of their application”, test them, and accept only those of them which we
assess (judge) as objective, while rejecting others as subjective or false.
(c) Reason. The peirastic (examining) character of human knowledge
is especially prominent in human reason in the following way. Pure rea-
son operates with ideas. Ideas, however, have not a constitutive function
but rather a regulative one. This means that they do not refer to objects.
To be more specific, ideas are formulae for a perspectival conceiving of
objects. The great mistake of the pre-critical metaphysics consisted in
the fact that it followed the inclination of human reason to use ideas
as if they referred to objects. For example, metaphysicians either claimed
that space and time are infinite, or that they are finite objects. In reality,
more, since the judgments are the minimal units of normativity, the subject is
responsible for their construction.
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space and time are neither finite nor infinite. They are only intuitions,
constructed with the help of rules for adding, or dividing, points of
space, or moments of time.
4 Second phase of the logicization of philosophy
4.1 Kant’s transcendental idealism as new logic
The conventional wisdom has it that the Aristotelian syllogistic played
only a subordinate role in Kant’s system: it simply served as a canon
for assessing human knowledge.8 In a sense, this claim is correct and
can be supported with abundant passages from KrV. The present section,
however, details the relation between them. Articulating this relation
opens a new, broader perspective on Kant’s magnum opus.
Moreover, we claim that Kant’s project for transcendental idealism
was no less than an advancement of a new formal discipline in philoso-
phy: of a new – transcendental – logic, which outlines the capacities of
pure reason. It was formal in the sense that it set the scope and validation
of the a priori functioning of thinking (understanding) and of the way in
which it is connected with material content. Its final objective was to ad-
vance “a complete table of the moments of thinking in general” (KrV,
A 71/B 96).
Furthermore, Kant’s new logic can be seen as a synthesis of (syllogis-
tic) logic and peirastic dialectic; by means of this synthesis it created a
logical system of the practice of examining. Arguably, with this act Kant ac-
complished something similar – although on a new level – to what Aris-
totle did in regard to Plato’s peirastic dialectic when he launched his syl-
logistic logic (cf. § 2, above).
Despite the fact that Kant’s new discipline was formal and so content-
less, in another respect it was a real program for contentful, or philosoph-
ical, logic. This is so because the procedure for examining the forms of
human understanding, which is intrinsically connected to its content
(or matter), was central to it.
8 Cf. Peckhaus, Volker: Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft. Ber-
lin 1997, 115.
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4.2 Kant’s new logic as transformation of Aristotle’s syllogistic
Listed below are four points that support the thesis that Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism is closely related to Aristotle’s logic:
(i) Both Aristotle and Kant claimed to have discovered a totally new
science. Indeed, in antiquity Aristotle identified himself as the originator
of the science of syllogistic logic: “I had no predecessors”, said he in Soph.
El. , 184b1–3. Similarly, Kant declared: “This [his transcendental ideal-
ism] is a totally new science which nobody has ever thought of” (Prol,
AA 04: 262). In the history of philosophy this claim from Aristotle
and Kant is more or less unique.
(ii) Similar to Aristotle’s syllogistic logic, transcendental idealism
claimed that all its elements are intrinsically connected with one another.
The point is that all parts of pure reason are organically connected. In
consequence, all concepts are transcendentally deducible from one prin-
ciple (Prol, AA 04: 260).
(iii) Exactly like Aristotle’s syllogistic logic, the function of transcen-
dental idealism was to advance a strict system of concepts and principles. It
was not devised as ars judicandi. This limited the heuristic power of
Kant’s philosophy and gave it a peculiar scholastic sway (cf. § 4.3,
below). However, the ingenuity of Kant’s philosophy was only seemingly
reduced. It received its full realization in Kant’s applied philosophy.
(iv) Again like Aristotle with his syllogistic logic, Kant claimed to ad-
vance a complete (vollstndige) system of principles which would not
need any improvement. It is as comprehensive as the grammars of the
natural languages.
The relatedness of Kant’s transcendental idealism to Aristotle’s syllogistic
is not difficult to explain. Indeed, in the act of judging – whose norms
were articulated in syllogistic form – Kant found “an act of the under-
standing which comprises all the rest and is distinguished only by various
modifications or phrases, in reducing the multiplicity of representation to
the unity of thinking in general” (Prol, § 39). More specifically, judgment
is a necessary element of all three forms of mental action discussed above,
in § 3.2:
in perception (in the synthesis of apperception) judgment unifies parts of the
multiplicity of the matter in one notion;
in thinking (the synthesis of apprehension) it connects notions in con-
cepts ;
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in understanding judgment selects elements of the multiplicity of con-
cepts and gathers them in ideas.
Moreover, besides the systematic relatedness between Kant’s new logic
and Aristotle’s syllogistic, there was apparently also a genealogical one.
Our thesis is that Kant derived his transcendental logic from Aristotle.
This claim can be supported by the fact – often discussed in the literature
– that Kant’s table of categories runs in parallel to Aristotle’s table of judg-
ments.9
4.3 The aftermath
The most important consequence of the introduction of Kant’s new logic
was that it transformed the practice of the traditional metaphysics into a
formal discipline: after this turn, philosophers started to treat their prob-
lems from a formal point of view. This practice can be called logocentric:
it helped to treat philosophical problems with formal method.10 It be-
came an idiosyncratic characteristic of German philosophy of the “big
nineteenth century” (1789–1914) and had great influence on the early
analytic philosophy. Most importantly, the German logocentrism in phi-
losophy was perpetuated even by such declared critics of Kant as Bernard
Bolzano.
One effect of this development was the “subsequent unavoidable dry-
ness, and scholastic precision” of philosophy (Prol, AA 04: 262). In short,
this was the result of the requirement that philosophy must develop not
spontaneously but rather under the control of the new canon. Indeed,
Kant was adamant that critical reason “keeps common reason in check
and prevents it from speculating” (ibid., 259). It is something like an in-
tellectual police (KrV, B xxv) which must keep philosophers away from
speculation.11 In a similar way, when confronted with it, the intellectuals
of the twentieth century, alien to the analytic tradition in philosophy, un-
derstood its function as a kind of “philosophical police.” This was also the
impression of Albert Einstein when he read some of Russell’s writings on
epistemology.
9 Cf. Wolff, Michael : Die Vollstndigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel. Frankfurt
1995.
10 H.-J. Glock first spoke of the logocentrism of German philosophy. See his “Vor-
sprung durch Logik: The German Analytic Tradition”, in: O’Hear, A. (ed.), Ger-
man Philosophy Since Kant. Cambridge 1999, 142 ff.
11 The metaphor of intellectual police is also used in Prol. , § 57.
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Another outcome was the establishing and dominance of professional
philosophy in German universities. As a result, “within the 25 years fol-
lowing the publishing of KrV, the great men contemplating the world sub
specie aeternitatis vanished from the philosophical scene.”12 Characteristi-
cally, this process was kindred to what happened after the victory of the
early analytical philosophy prevailed in the late 1920s and in the 1930s
on the academic scene. The latter development, in turn, was related to
the effects that Aristotle’s attack had on Plato’s dialectics. Indeed, this at-
tack “may usefully be compared with the attempt of the twentieth-centu-
ry positivists to free science from metaphysics. Aristotle rejects the preten-
sions of a non-empirical discipline claiming to be a science and to pre-
scribe to the genuine empirical sciences.”13 This parallelism is not acci-
dental. What we have here is nothing but the relatedness of the last
two phases of the logicization of philosophy discussed in this paper.
5 Third phase of the logicization of philosophy
5.1 Early analytic philosophers synthesize logic with peirastic dialectic
At the very end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twen-
tieth, the logicization of philosophy came to its third phase. A major role
in this process was played by the imposing figures of G. E. Moore, Rus-
sell and Wittgenstein.
Kant’s new logic was related to the early Cambridge analytic philos-
ophy in four main ways:
(a) Logic as prima philosophia. A main tenet of the early Cambridge
analytic philosophers was that logic is prima philosophia: it is determina-
tive of all philosophical disciplines. Russell made this point with partic-
ular clarity: “All sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of prop-
ositions.”14 (Philosophical) logic was basic to philosophy for G. E. Moore
as well. This is evident, for example, in his concept of the “naturalistic
fallacy.” For Moore, “good” is a synthetic a priori concept that cannot
be defined through reference to facts of the real world. On this matter
Moore followed (via Henry Sidgwick) Kant’s insistence that freedom is
12 Hegel, Sc. Log. , § 26.
13 Irwin, Terence: Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford 1988, 147.
14 Russell, Bertrand: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. Cambridge
1900, 8.
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intrinsically valuable and so “must be conceived as wholly independent of
the natural law” (Prol § 53).
An expression of the (very Kantian) assumption that logic is the lead-
ing philosophical discipline was the belief of the early analytic philoso-
phers (of Russell of 1914 in particular) that “philosophy [i. e. logic] is
a study apart from the other sciences.”15 Exactly like Russell, in the Trac-
tatus (4.111), Wittgenstein insisted that “philosophy is not one of the
natural sciences. (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something which
stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)” This was a
clear anti-naturalistic stance, markedly at odds with the Quineian “analyt-
ic naturalism” that prevailed in North America during the second half of
the twentieth century.
(b) The role of judgment. Exactly as for Kant, for the early analytic
philosophers the act of judging was central to philosophy. G. E.
Moore, in his “The Nature of Judgement” (1899), accepted that a judge-
ment, or a proposition, is composed of concepts, with a specific relation
between them. Concepts are infinite numbers of independent entities
with relations between them that are independent as well. This was
Moore’s relational theory of judgement and reality (he considered them
identical).
Moore’s theory was replaced by Russell’s multiple relation theory of
judgement, developed in his famous Theory of Descriptions. It asserts
“the existence of individuals with which we are not acquainted. The
role of the description is, more precisely, to construct an individual
with the help of general terms and concepts, and from pieces of reality
with which we were previously acquainted. … A main role in this con-
structing is played by the creative selecting and ordering of individuals
with which we are acquainted, in order to make the description (con-
struction) of the individual in question. This is nothing more than a
form of selecting – in deliberation – what there is.”16
Wittgenstein’s central theme was also that of judgement: the picking
out of a certain complex a given set of simples. This was a problem he
tried to solve in1915,17 but failed. When Wittgenstein returned to philos-
ophy in the 1929, he continued to explore the paradox of composition-
ality (e. g. in his Philosophical Investigations, § 47). His solution was the
kaleidoscope principle, or the aspect-changing perceiving of a complex.
15 Idem: Our Knowledge of the External World. London 1914, 240.
16 N. Milkov: A Hundred Years of English Philosophy. Dordrecht 2003, 61 f.
17 Cf. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916. Oxford 1979, 68.
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At different moments we grasp one of the figurations of the complex, the
others remaining in shadow,18 and it is up to us – to our judgement – to
choose which figuration will be contemplated.
(c) From logic to criticism. The philosophical logic of the early analytic
philosophers advanced logical canons,19 with the help of which it exam-
ined and criticized philosophical and scientific propositions. The most
prominent example of this practice was the just discussed Theory of De-
scriptions, which became the “paradigm of analytic philosophy” (Ramsey)
exactly because it suggested such a rigorous device that even Wittgenstein
did not criticize it. Generations of analytic philosophers examined tradi-
tional metaphysics from this perspective.20 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
too advanced a logical canon in the form of a “general propositional
form” (4.47). Finally, the logical positivists overcame the old metaphysics
with reference to the canon of “the principle of verification.”
(d) Criticism (peirastic dialecticSimilar to Kant’s philosophy, early an-
alytic philosophy had a clear peirastic or critical stance. Moreover, at the
beginning, analytic philosophy was conceived of as an essentially critical
philosophy.21 Moore’s main task, to begin with him again, was to examine
and criticize metaphysical non-demonstratives: to translate the arguments
of the traditional philosophers into concrete terms. This was an activity
of clarification by which he relied on his own intuition as a highest
court of appeal.
Wittgenstein’s objective in the Tractatus was similar to that of Moore:
testing and examining – i. e. , criticizing – the propositions of philoso-
phers, above all, of Frege and Russell. In this sense he defined philosophy
as activity, not as theory (4.112). Wittgenstein eliminated in this way the
logical constants, the theory of types, the multiple relation theory of
judgment, the axiom of infinity, and other theories and arguments.
The later Wittgenstein exercised the practice of examining based on inar-
ticulable rules that can be roughly defined as a combination of anti-essen-
tialism and non-reductivism. The general requirement was to oppose
third, mediating entities by analysing the contact between two formations
(mind and body, proposition and fact, etc.), but at the same time to avoid
18 Cf. Milkov, op. cit. , 85.
19 In this respect it was related to syllogistic logic.
20 Martin Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik?; cf. Carnap, Rudolf : “berwindung der
Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”. Erkenntnis 2 (1931), 220–241.
21 Cf. Broad, Charles: “Critical and Speculative Philosophy”, in: Muirhead, J. H.
(ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, London 1924, 75–100.
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the reduction of one of these formations to the other, or their mutual fu-
sion.22
Criticism was also a central motive in Russell’s philosophy. Indeed, in
The Problems of Philosophy he defined his philosophy as “a criticism of
knowledge.”23 It aims at “a critical examination of the grounds of our
convictions, prejudices, and beliefs.”24 In the early 1940s Russell even
wrote the paper “The Art of Rational Conjecture.”25 Philosophers have
only recently discovered this side of Russell’s philosophy.26
5.2 Analytic philosophy as successor of the transcendental idealism
Kant’s new logic was not simply kindred to analytic philosophy, with
many curricular or stylistic similarities between them. In fact, the
whole of early analytic philosophy can be seen as a furtherance of Kantian
ideas and, more precisely, of his new logic, which investigated philosoph-
ical problems with logical means and which substantiated the critical
practice of examination.27
This point explains why Wittgenstein’s philosophy is easily interpret-
ed as Kantian. Indeed, both suggested logical canons and used them as
means for criticism – as a “negative touchstone of truth” (KrV, A65/
B85), the only difference between Kant and Wittgenstein in this respect
being “what Kant’s transcendental deductions are intended to perform:
this is performed [by Wittgenstein] by the logical analysis of language.”28
For their part, Oxford ordinary language philosophers rediscovered
their philosophy as Kantian. This is clearly seen in “Metaphysics”
(1957), a manifesto article of the most promising conceptual analysts
of the time: Paul Grice, David Pears and Peter Strawson. These authors
made the claim that analytic metaphysics (their sub-discipline of prefer-
ence) is concerned with the conceptual preconditions of the whole of
22 Cf. Milkov, op. cit. , 86.
23 Russell, Bertrand: The Problems of Philosophy. London 1912, 234.
24 Ibid., 239.
25 Cf. Russell, Bertrand: “The Art of Rational Conjecture”, in The Art of Philoso-
phizing. Lanham (MD) 1974, 1–36.
26 The first step in this direction was made in Hare, William: “Bertrand Russell on
Critical Thinking”, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy,
vol. 3. Boston 1998.
27 Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford 2001.
28 Stenius, Erik: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford 1964, p. 218.
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knowledge, preconditions that were explored comprehensively only by
Kant. Investigating the conceptual prerequisites of human understanding
is also the main concern in Peter Strawson’s Individuals, a book that
Strawson himself called “Kantian.”
For the attentive historian of philosophy, the crypto-Kantianism of
the early analytic philosophy is not surprising.
6 Epilogue
At the end of this paper, we would like to make the following remark. In
the case of early analytic philosophy, for the first time in the history of
philosophy a leading philosophical movement was advanced that was
not connected with a proper name. Until that point in time, the world
had heard about Platonists, Aristotelians, Thomists and Cartesians.
Now, a new nameless philosophy appeared which can be simply called
“rigorous philosophy.”
The case with Kant was something different. Indeed, his name is the
most celebrated in the history of philosophy. At the same time, however,
the very fact that Kant was “rediscovered” in the second half of the nine-
teenth century by the so called “neo-Kantians”, and also the zeal with
which their enemies fought them, as well as the diversity of the “neo-
Kantians” themselves, suggests that it was not just the philosophy of
one person that was at stake. Rather, disputed was the new, logicized phi-
losophy as a type of philosophy. In the fin-de-sicle the latter was rediscov-
ered and reintroduced as “analytic philosophy.” At the same time, the
“neo-Kantianism” perished, which suggests that this was only a metamor-
phosis of the new type of philosophy – logicized philosophy – examples
of which already existed in antiquity.
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